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Abstract. In this work we investigate the problem of simultaneous privacy and integrity protection
in cryptographic circuits. We consider a white-box scenario with a powerful, yet limited attacker. A
concise metric for the level of probing and fault security is introduced, which is directly related to
the capabilities of a realistic attacker. In order to investigate the interrelation of probing and fault
security we introduce a common mathematical framework based on the formalism of information
and coding theory. The framework unifies the known linear masking schemes. We proof a central
theorem about the properties of linear codes which leads to optimal secret sharing schemes. These
schemes provide the lower bound for the number of masks needed to counteract an attacker with
a given strength. The new formalism reveals an intriguing duality principle between the problems
of probing and fault security, and provides a unified view on privacy and integrity protection using
error detecting codes. Finally, we introduce a new class of linear tamper-resistant codes. These are
eligible to preserve security against an attacker mounting simultaneous probing and fault attacks.
Keywords. probing attacks, fault attacks, side channel attacks, coding theory, secret sharing, secure
computation.
1 Introduction
In the traditional cryptographic setting it is assumed that the adversary has only black-box
access to the cryptographic algorithm. He can query the apparatus executing the algorithm
with inputs of his choice and observe the answer (chosen plain text scenario). The secret key
has been loaded into the device in the outset and is not accessible to the adversary. A further
basic assumption is that the attacker has full knowledge of the algorithm—he can build a model
of the device and query it based on his guess for the secret.
In practice, however, the black-box assumption is realized rarely. This applies particularly to
a device which can be physically accessed by the attacker during operation. Present-day society
heavily relies on the security of such cryptographic devices. Examples are electronic ID cards,
smart cards for payment purposes, mobile phones, network devices, and personal computers. All
of these can be easily seized by an attacker. In this setting both the privacy and the integrity
assumption inherent in the black-box model do not hold any more:
Firstly, due to the physical nature of computation there is always some amount of informa-
tion leakage from intermediate stages of the computation. Secondly, information from interme-
diate stages can be actively probed without disturbing the computation. Thirdly, the physical
processes taking place during computation can be actively disturbed in order to induce faulty in-
termediate values. These three fundamental physical constraints on cryptographic computation
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are known as the side-channel (SCA), the probing (PRA), and the fault (FA) attack scenario,
respectively.
There are many physical sources for side-channel information leakage during the execution of
an algorithm which is otherwise secure under the black-box assumption. Especially the analysis
of the information leakage on the power line of a physical device has had considerable impact on
the art of secure cryptographic algorithm implementation during the last decade [13]. Differential
Power Analysis (DPA) represents an actual threat for commonly used cryptographic devices,
because the work factor for a DPA attack is comparably moderate with respect to the equipment,
the skill, and the computing power [6,15,17].
Probing attacks can be considered as even more powerful than SCA attacks, because the
attacker monitors a local physical value (e.g. a voltage level on some wire), which is directly
related to a data value. There are many sophisticated probing techniques available ranging from
the placement of needles to optical probing methods [1,4]. Throughout this paper we will use
the term probe for any method that allows to record a local value in a computation.
Both SCA and PRA attacks are highly efficient if they are used in the differential setup. Here,
a few carefully chosen local values are probed and traces for several runs of the algorithm with
different inputs are recorded. The analysis of the collected data values can already reveal the
whole key or at least reduce the key space to a level that allows a brute force attack. Theoretical
results on highly efficient differential probing attacks (DPRA) on private key and public key
cryptosystems have recently been reported [9,19].
The third class of physical attacks, fault attacks, is particularly interesting, because the
violation of integrity can be exploited to break privacy [1,22]. It has been demonstrated that the
injection of a small number of a specific kind of faults can be used to break private key [3] and
public key [5] cryptosystems.
Clearly, there is a tireless quest for countermeasures against all of these kinds of attacks. As
physical security seems to be out of reach (in the sense that anything can be proven) counter-
measures based on mathematical reasoning are of particular interest. However, in the field of
probing attacks the impossibility of obfuscation [2] rules out the security against an all-powerful
attacker. Hence, the capabilities of the attacker have to be restricted by model assumptions
[18]. Secret sharing schemes have been proposed to provide privacy against an attacker who is
limited to place at most q needles [12]. In the context of DPA secret sharing schemes have been
introduced as data masking. For example, in a simple masking scheme with two shares a data
value x is lifted to the pair of values (x⊕m,m), where the mask value m has the properties of a
uniformly distributed random variable. Obviously the pair (x⊕m,m) is secure against probing
with one needle.
The detection (and correction) of faults has a long history in coding theory [14,20]. Trivially,
the capability to detect errors requires the introduction of information redundancy. An appro-
priate error detection code can be devised depending on the kind of errors the attacker is able
to inject. If, for example, it can be assumed that an attacker is able to flip at most f bits in a
memory word, and the attack should be detected with certainty, an error detection code with
minimum distance f + 1 could be used. On the other hand error detecting codes have also be
used for the construction of secret sharing schemes [16].
The crucial challenge is, however, to provide security against an attacker of limited, but
considerable power, who is able to perform both probing and fault attacks. First theoretical
foundations for such tamper-resistant devices have been laid in recent works [8,11]. Both, secret
sharing schemes and error detection codes introduce redundancy into the realization of the
cryptographic device. However, little is known about the interrelation between simultaneous
probing and fault resistance countermeasures.
This work is organized in four sections. In Section 2 we define a concise metric for the level
of probing security, which is directly related to the capabilities of a realistic attacker. In order
to investigate the interrelation of probing security and fault security we introduce a common
mathematical language within the framework of information and coding theory. In Section 3 we
prove a theorem about the properties of codes which can be used for the construction of optimal
masking schemes. In particular, we describe linear codes which are optimal with respect to the
number of introduced masks (OPS codes). The new formalism reveals an intriguing duality
principle between the problems of probing and fault security. In Section 4 we compare the
information leakage of optimal privacy preserving codes and classical masking schemes. Finally,
in Section 5 we fuse privacy and integrity protection and introduce a new class of optimal
tamper-resistant codes (OTR codes), which are eligible to preserve security against an attacker
mounting simultaneous probing and fault attacks.
2 Preliminaries
It is suggestive to describe an arbitrary apparatus used to perform a cryptographic computation
in terms of an (electronic) switching circuit. Then the collection of interconnects between the
switching elements, the wires x1, x2, . . . , xk, carry the complete intermediary state information.
Each wire xi transports an information signal xi(t) as a function of time. To simplify notation,
we consider only discrete evaluation cycles in time, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , and binary signal values on
the wires throughout this paper. This model fits CMOS circuit technology already very well,
which is today the dominating technology for the implementation of electronic (cryptographic)
devices. Hence we can express all xit = xi(t) by elements of the binary field F2. A generalization
to n-ary circuit logic is immediate. Also the problem of probing analogue signals can be described
in the presented formalism by quantizing and mapping the continuum of analogue values to an
appropriate number of discrete values. We are now ready to define probing attacks given an
adversary of quantifiable strength. All the definitions are in accordance with the definitions of
differential cryptanalysis, differential fault attacks, and differential power analysis (of order q).
Definition 1. In a Probing Attack of Order q, PRA(q), an adversary is capable of obtaining
the values (x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xq,t) on q wires of his choice in a circuit for an arbitrary number of
evaluation cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
Definition 2. In a Differential Probing Attack of Order q, DPRA(q), an adversary is capable of
obtaining the values xt = (x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xq,t) on q wires of a circuit for an arbitrary number of
evaluation cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Furthermore, xt is related to some known information (e.g. the
cipher text) and a secret k via a set of λ equations fi(xt, ct,k) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ λ. By collecting
multiple different pairs (xt, ct) and evaluating these equations the adversary determines some
or all bits of the secret k.
It should be noted that DPRA(q) attacks can be highly efficient. DPRA(q) works in the
cipher text only scenario and is even more efficient in a known plain text setting. Probing one
bit at a carefully selected position and collecting the values of a few encryptions can already
reveal the whole key or at least reduce the key space to a work factor that allows a brute force
attack. Examples for efficient DPRA(1) and DPRA(3) attacks on the AES are given in [19]:
The information collected from a single probe during 168 encryptions reveals the secret key. In
a known plain text setting three probes and 26 cipher texts are already sufficient. Less efficient
attacks on DES, RC5, and public cryptosystems have already been described in an early work [9].
Let us now formally consider the state of the k wires of the circuit at time t as a message
word
xt = (x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xk,t) ∈ X = Fk2.
in some message space X . If an attacker has access to a small, but carefully selected set of q
coordinates of the message word over some period of time, he will generally be able to extract
the secret in a DPRA(q) attack. Privacy can be preserved if the message is augmented by a
number of s masks
mt = (m1,t,m2,t, . . . ,ms,t) ∈M = Fs2.
Definition 3. A mask mit is defined to be a value (on a wire) which can be described as an
independent and uniformly distributed binary random variable.
In practical circuit designs a balanced i.i.d. sequence of mask bits could be generated by a
random bit stream generator (RBG). This sequence is routed on a wire to a destination circuit
element in which the mask bits are finally combined with message bits. The crucial point is the
setup of an optimal masking scheme against an adversary with given probing capabilities. A
masking scheme describes the way the vector of masks mt is combined with the message vector
xt in each evaluation cycle. In the following we show that the problem of finding an optimal
masking scheme can be expressed as a channel coding problem.
In general we have an encoding function g, which is a map
g : X ×M→ Y ⊆ FN2
(x,m) 7→ y = (y1, y2, . . . , yN )
with n = s + k, N ≥ n. The dimension of the image is equal to n, because we must be able
to decode the message and we assume that every mask is used. If no redundancy for integrity
protection is introduced we have N = n. In the next sections we consider pure masking schemes
(N = n). Finally, in section 5 we will introduce tamper-resistant codes which are both, capable
of preserving privacy and integrity (N > n).
The following definition is crucial:
Definition 4. A circuit is probing secure of order q, we write PS(q), if for each choice of indices
i1, i2, . . . , iq with 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · < iq ≤ n the condition
I(X1, X2, . . . , Xk;Yi1 , Yi2 , . . . , Yiq) = 0
on the mutual information [7] holds, where the message Xi and the masked message Yi are
represented by discrete random variables with p(xi) = Pr{Xi = xi,t} and p(yi) = Pr{Yi = yi,t},
respectively, at each point in time t.
In other words, a circuit is PS(q), if it does not leak any information on the message bits xi to an
attacker, who can simultaneously probe q wires yi of his choice over an arbitrary period of time.
If this condition holds the attack will fail regardless of whether a simple or differential probing
setup is used according to Definition 1 or 2, respectively. It should be noted, that Definition 4 is
a natural generalization of the notion of correlation-immunity of a Boolean function, introduced
by Siegenthaler [21]. This definition is also in accordance with the definition of a power analysis
of order q, cf. [15].
At this point a natural question arises:
What is the lower bound for the number of masks needed to protect a circuit
with k wires against an adversary who is able to mount a probing attack of
order q?
This information is important for the design of privacy preserving masked circuits, because
circuit size increases strongly with the number of masks. Luckily, experience from physical failure
analysis shows that in recent IC technologies access to single wires becomes painfully difficult [4].
Hence the relation between the number of probes and the work factor of the attack is also a
strongly increasing function. Therefore, in order to design an optimal privacy preserving circuit
for a work factor which is commensurate with the protection period and value of the secret,
it is necessary to know the lower bound for the number of masks. If the optimal number is
known, this value can be used as a target or benchmark for designs of cryptographic circuits.
The construction of the masking schemes presented in the next section is based on linear block
codes. These linear schemes are optimal in the sense that they require the smallest number of
masks for a given number of information bits.
3 Optimal linear masking schemes, OPS-Codes
We shall use the following notation: Gij is a i×j matrix over F2, Ik is the k×k unit matrix, Oij
is the i× j zero matrix, and 1k is the row vector of k ones. Furthermore, xT is the transposed
vector (matrix) of x. The message augmented with the vector of masks is denoted by the row
vector u = (x,m). We can express any linear masking scheme by
y = uG,
where G is the generator matrix of the code. As usual the parity check matrix is defined by
HyT = 0,
and we have the relations
H = (Q|I), G = (I|QT ) (1)
choosing the systematic form of the code.
We now define the canonical form of the code for a linear masking scheme.
Proposition 1. The n×n generator matrix G for a masking scheme with s masks and n−s data
values can be written in the following canonical form:
G =
(
In−s|On−s,s
Pqs,n
)
with Pqs,n = (Qs,n−s|Is). (2)
Proof. Using elementary row operations and column interchanges the generator matrix of a code
can be converted into that of an equivalent code in the given canonical form. 
In the canonical form the first k = n − s coordinates yi of a code word y are given by the
corresponding message bits plus a linear combination of masks, yi = xi+
∑s
j=1mjQji, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
The last s coordinates are single mask bits.
Definition 5. We shall call Pqs,n the probing matrix of order q.
It has s rows (number of masks) and n = k + s columns (number of masks plus data bits). The
probing security of the corresponding masking scheme is indicated by the superscript q. We now
provide some examples.
The classical one-time pad (OTP) encryption scheme of Gilbert Vernam [23] follows in a
natural way as one special case. Every bit of the message is masked with an individual key
stream (mask) bit. OTP provides perfect secrecy under the black-box assumption for the masks.
However, in the setting of physically observable computation the masks are also subject to the
q-th order probing attack. In our new formalism Vernam’s masking scheme is defined by the
probing matrix
P1k,2k = (Ik|Ik).
Obviously the OTP scheme is only PS(1). An attacker with two needles is able to probe a
masked value and the corresponding mask bit and can therefore compromise the security of the
masking scheme. With one needle no attack is possible. It is important to point out that there
are other PS(1) masking schemes. One mask is already sufficient to protect an arbitrary number
of k information bits against a PA(1) attack. The corresponding canonical probing matrix is
P11,k = (1k|1).
We note that this matrix is identical to the H-Matrix of a single parity check code for k data
bits. Another trivial case is the construction of the PS(q) masking scheme for maximum probing
security of one data bit. Clearly we need s = q masks to expand one information bit to q + 1
shares. The corresponding canonical probing matrix
Pqq,q+1 = (1
T
q |Iq)
is the H-Matrix of a repetition code. Inspired by these observations we can now formulate one
of our main results.
Theorem 1. A linear masking scheme is probing secure of order q, if and only if the probing
matrix Pqs,n has the property that any q columns are linearly independent.
Proof. Let us denote the ith column of the probing matrix by Pi so that P
q
s,n = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn).
To show the necessity of the condition, assume to the contrary that there are h columns of
Pqs,n with h ≤ q such that Pi1 + · · ·+Pih = 0. By summing up the corresponding yi1 , . . . , yih all
involved mask bits will cancel out resulting in yi1 + · · · + yih = xj1 + · · · + xjb . It follows that
I(x1, . . . , xk; yi1 + · · ·+yih) = 1 which implies that I(x1, . . . , xk; yi1 , . . . , yih) cannot be zero, and
the masking scheme cannot be probing secure of order q according to Definition 4.
To show the sufficiency we consider the table of function values of the function f : u ∈ Fn2 7→
uG ∈ Fn2 . This is a 2n×2n matrix denoted by [u,uG] where u runs through the elements of Fn2 .
Recall that u has the form u = (x,m), where x = (x1, . . . , xk) is the vector of all k information
bits, and m = (m1, . . . ,ms) is made up by the s masking bits. Because of the linearity of f , we
can add any two rows of [u,uG], and the sum will be again a row of [u,uG]. In other words,
the rows of the matrix [u,uG] constitute an n-dimensional vector space over F2 denoted by W
which is a subspace of F2n2 .
Let 1 ≤ i1 < i2 < · · · < iq ≤ n be arbitrary. Set [u,uG] = (A1, . . . , An;B1, . . . , Bn). For the
proof the following 2n × (k + q) submatrix M of [u,uG] is essential, where
M = (A1, . . . , Ak;Bi1 , . . . , Biq). (3)
We claim that among the 2n rows of M there are exactly 2s−q all-zero rows. We will make use
of the standard basis vectors of the vector space Fn2 given by
e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), e2 = (0, 1, . . . , 0), . . . , en = (0, 0, . . . , 1).
Consider the s standard basis vectors ek+1, ek+2, . . . , ek+s. The 2s linear combinations (over F2)
of these vectors will produce all row vectors of Fn2 whose first k coordinates are zero.
Let V ⊂ Fn2 be the vector space spanned by ek+1, . . . , ek+s. Clearly, dim(V ) = s. By hypoth-
esis, the q columns Pi1 , . . . , Piq of the probing matrix P
q
s,n are linearly independent. This implies
that the matrix B = (Bi1 , . . . , Biq) has rank q. Consider the linear mapping
φ : v ∈ V 7→ vB ∈ Fq2.
By elementary linear algebra,
dim(V ) = dim(ker(φ)) + dim(Im(φ)).
Since dim(V ) = s, and dim(Im(φ)) = rank(B) = q, we conclude that dim(ker(φ)) = s− q. Thus
there are 2s−q vectors v ∈ V for which vB = 0. It follows that the matrix M in (3) has 2s−q
all-zero rows.
It is now easy to see, that the set U of all vectors of W , which are zero in positions
1, . . . , k, i1, . . . , iq, forms a (s − q)-dimensional subspace of the n-dimensional vector space W .
Consider the cosets w + U , w ∈ W , of the subspace U in W . The distinct cosets of U have all
the same cardinality, namely 2s−q, the cardinality of U . This implies that among the 2n rows of
the matrix M in (3) each of the vectors of Fk+q2 occurs exactly 2s−q times or, equivalently, with
probability 2s−q−n. Thus, for x = (x1, . . . , xk) and z = (yi1 , . . . , yiq), we have p(x, z) = 2s−q−n,
p(x) = 2−k, and p(z) = 2−q. Since k = n− s it follows that the mutual information, cf. Defini-
tion 4, of x and z vanishes:
I(x; z) =
∑
x
∑
z
p(x, z) log2
p(x, z)
p(x)p(z)
= 2n−s+q2s−q−n log2
2s−q−n
2−k2−q
= 0.

Theorem 1 shows that the problem of constructing a masking scheme for a given order of probing
security PS(q) is equivalent to the problem of constructing a code with given minimum distance
dmin = q + 1. This is immediate, if we recall that the minimum distance dmin of a linear code
equals the smallest positive integer n such that there are n columns in the parity check matrix
which are linearly dependent [14].
The difference in the case of masking is, that the probing matrix has to meet the constraints
that are usually imposed on the parity check matrix in the setting of channel coding. Hence we
can state:
In the coding theoretical sense the problem of preserving privacy in a circuit
subject to probing attacks is dual to the problem of preserving integrity in a
circuit subject to fault attacks.
In Section 5 the duality aspect will be treated further by considering simultaneous probing and
forcing attacks.
Based on Theorem 1 we now provide constructions for codes with different levels of probing
security, which are optimal with respect to the number of masks.
Definition 6. An Optimal Probing Secure Code, OPS(n,k;q), is a linear block code of length n
and dimension k which provides probing security of order q, PS(q), for k information bits and
has the minimal number s = n− k of mask bits.
By virtue of Theorem 1 the existing results from the field of coding theory can be used for the
construction of good masking schemes for any order of probing security. The construction of
optimal masking schemes for PS(2) and PS(3) is quite easy:
– The canonical probing matrix P2n−k,n of the OPS(n,k;2) code is identical to the parity check
matrix of a (shortened) [2s− 1, 2s− s− 1, 3] Hamming code. An example for the OPS(7,4;2)
masking scheme can be found in Appendix A.
– The canonical probing matrix P3n−k,n of the OPS(n,k;3) code is identical to the parity check
matrix of a (shortened) [2s−1, 2s−1 − s, 4] Hsiao code [10]. An example for the OPS(16,11;3)
masking scheme can be found in Appendix B.
order of probing security q
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 ∞
2 ∞ 3
3 ∞ 7 4
4 ∞ 15 8 5
5 ∞ 31 16 6 6
s 6 ∞ 63 32 8 7 7
7 ∞ 127 64 11 9 8 8
8 ∞ 255 128 17 12 9 9 9
9 ∞ 511 256 23 18 11 10 10 10
10 ∞ 1023 512 34-37 24 15 12 11 11 11
11 ∞ 2047 1024 48-60 35-37 23 16 12 12 12 12
12 ∞ 4095 2048 66-88 49-61 24 24 14 13 13 13 13
Table 1. Maximum lengths n of OPS(n,k;q) codes for masking schemes given the number of
masks s and the order of probing security q.
For probing security PS(q) with order q > 3 the task of finding the optimal code becomes
already nontrivial. Table 1 shows the upper bound on the length n of the optimum code given
the number of masks 1 ≤ s ≤ 12 and the probing security 1 ≤ q ≤ 12. The condensed information
in Table 1 reflects various sources—books, articles, as well as online data bases. For some values
only intervals for the maximum possible length can be given, because only lower and upper
bounds for the minimum distances of the corresponding codes are known. These table entries
are italicized.
Probing security of order PS(1) for an unbounded number of information bits can already be
achieved by introducing one mask (Tab. 1, column 1). The maximum lengths for OPS(n,k;2) and
OPS(n,k;3) masking schemes are 2s−1 and 2s−1, respectively. These are shown in columns 2 and
3. The probing matrices correspond to the mentioned Hamming and Hsiao codes, respectively.
The trivial OPS(n,1;n-1) codes, which provide maximum probing security for one data bit, are
found on the diagonal line. Some comments on a few more selected entries of the table are given:
The entry for q = 4, s = 8 corresponds to the [17, 9, 5] quadratic residue code which generates an
OPS(17,9;4) masking scheme. This scheme will be used as an example in the following section,
cf. also Appendix C. The entries for q = 6, s = 11 and q = 7, s = 12 are the [23, 12, 7] Golay code
G23 and the [24, 12, 8] Golay code G24, respectively. It should be noted that the maximal length
of a code for a given number of masks decreases rapidly with increasing order of probing security.
Hence, achieving a high order of probing security in a circuit, say q ≥ 4, becomes inefficient in
terms of the number of masks. PS(2) and PS(3) masking schemes, however, are efficient and
may be of high practical relevance.
4 Information leakage of OPS Masking schemes
Let us consider a simple probing attack PA(q) on a masked circuit for increasing order q =
1, 2, . . . . Obviously, with an increasing number of probes q the circuit will leak more and more
information. For the moment we do not take into account the possibility that a differential
DPRA(q) attack might reveal the total information already for a small number of probes. Fur-
thermore, let us consider an intelligent attacker who follows the optimum strategy in placing the
probes. The incremental information leakage for different masking schemes will generally look
different. In Fig. 1 the information leakage of a circuit protected by Vernam’s OTP scheme (×),
i.e. one mask per information bit, an OPS(16,11;3) masking scheme with 5 mask bits (5) and
an OPS(17,9;4) masking scheme with 8 mask bits (4) are compared. For reference purposes the
information leakage of an unmasked circuit (+) is also shown. The unmasked circuit exhibits
a constant information leakage rate of one bit per probe. (We assume that the information on
the wires is statistically independent.) The Vernam masking scheme shows a constant average
leakage rate of 0.5 bit per probe, because the best attack strategy is to probe one masked wire
and the corresponding mask. In contrast, the OPS masking schemes leak no information up
to the built-in level of probing security, which is 3 and 4 needles, respectively, in our example.
For an increasing number of probes the information leakage is still below that of the Vernam
scheme. The OPS(16,11;3) masking scheme reaches the Vernam leakage rate at 7 probes, while
the OPS(17,9;4) scheme arrives at this rate not until 15 probes. Asymptotically all OPS leakage
rates converge to a rate of one bit per probe like in an unmasked circuit. Metaphorically speak-
ing an OPS masking scheme draws on a private credit to bravely resist attacks with a moderate
number of needles, but the scheme collapses, if a critical charge is reached.
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Fig. 1. Information leakage of an OPS(16,11;3) code (5) and and OPS(17,9;4) code (4) in a
probing attack with increasing number of needles. For comparison an unmasked circuit (+) and
Vernam’s masking scheme (×) is also shown. The lines serve as a guide to the eye.
5 Simultaneous probing and fault security, OTR-Codes
It is evident to ask for the generalization of a probing secure circuit to a tamper-resistant
circuit, which simultaneously preserves privacy and integrity. Before further analysis we need
to set up a precise fault attack model for an attacker who can simultaneously mount probing
and fault attacks. An important subclass of physical fault attacks are forcing attacks. In this
model we assume that a powerful attacker has full control on the values of up to f wires
of his choice. An attacker has various physical methods to perform such a surgical, i.e. local
attack. A powerful attacker could place f probes and overdrive the signal values on the wire by
applying the appropriate electric potential. The work factor for such an attack resembles that
of a probing attack. In a weaker, i.e. less controlled forcing attack (of statistical nature), pulses
of electromagnetic radiation (e.g. from one or more lasers) could be used to flip signal values
within some radius of influence. The faulty signal values will follow some probability distribution
(depending on several physical parameters). In this attack the work factor for the setup will be
smaller. However, the attacker will have to repeat the attack many times to generate an error
vector that will lead to the intended information leakage. If we can assume that only up to f
bits are modified, this attack is also covered by our model (random forcing attack).
Definition 7. In a Forcing Attack of Order f, FRA(f), an adversary is able to force values
(x1,t, x2,t, . . . , xf,t) on f wires of his choice in a circuit to 0 or 1 for an arbitrary number of
evaluation cycles t = 1, 2, . . . , T . That means he is able to imprint a (possibly changing) vector
of values et = (e1,t, e2,t, . . . , ef,t) on a subset of f wires in subsequent evaluation cycles t.
Definition 8. A circuit is forcing secure of order f, we write FRS(f), if every error in a forcing
attack of order f can be detected.
It should be noted, that with Definition 8 we stress the importance of error detection as a
precondition to a reaction on the error. We do not impose any restriction on the decision whether
the circuit should be constructed such that the error can be corrected or whether the circuit
should enter a secure state. The latter could be an irreversible transition to a state in which the
secrets are deleted and the circuit is inoperative (self-destruction).
We can now proceed, in the spirit of Definition 6, to develop an encoding scheme for inter-
mediary state variables, e.g. the wires of a circuit, which provides security against simultaneous
probing and fault attacks.
Definition 9. An Optimal Tamper Resistant Code, OTR(n,k,j;f,q), is a linear block code of
length n, dimension k, and j information bits, which is simultaneously forcing secure of order f
and probing secure of order q, i.e. PS(q) and FRS(f). The number of redundancy bits r = n− k
and the number of mask bits s = k − j are minimal.
In the second central theorem the canonical form of the OTR code is given and necessary
conditions for the existence are derived.
Theorem 2. W.l.o.g. the canonical shape of the generator matrix of an OTR code can be written
in the form
G =
(
Ij O Sj,r
Qs,j Is Rs,r
)
, (4)
where the probing matrix (cf. Eqn. 2) is given by
Pqs,n = (Qs,j |Is|Rs,r). (5)
The code is OTR(n,k,j;f,q), i.e. simultaneously PS(q) and FRS(f), if and only if the following
three conditions hold:
1. The parity check matrix of the code is given by
Hfr,k = (S
T
r,j |RTr,s − STr,jQTj,s|Ir). (6)
2. Any q columns of Pqs,n are linearly independent.
3. Any f columns of Hfr,k are linearly independent.
Proof. Given the parity check matrix (6) and using (1) the corresponding generator matrix
G′ =
(
Ij O Sj,r
O Is Rs,r −Qs,jSj,r
)
is obtained. We now transform G′ to an equivalent code G. Multiplying the upper slice by
Qs,j and adding the result to the lower slice we arrive at (4). The second condition follows
immediately from Theorem 1. The third condition follows trivially from the definition of the
minimum distance of a code. 
The construction of an OTR code for a given number of wires and a given order of probing
and forcing security, i.e. the triplet (j, q, f), is a nontrivial task. It corresponds to the problem
of finding a triplet of matrices (Qs,j ,Sj,r,Rs,r), such that the corresponding probing (5) and
parity check (6) matrices simultaneously fulfil the constraints on the minimum number of linearly
independent columns. The competing constraints on the probing and the parity check matrix
indicate again the duality of the privacy and the integrity protection problem, cf. Section 3.
It is convenient to recall a theorem of Gilbert and Varshamov:
Theorem 3. (Gilbert & Varshamov) Let l,m, n ∈ N with l ≤ m ≤ n. There exists a binary m×n
matrix with the property that any l columns are linearly independent, if
∑l−1
i=0
(
n−1
i
)
< 2m.
Evidently, an OTR(n, k, j; f, q) code fulfils the two Gilbert-Varshamov inequalities
q−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
< 2k−j and
f−1∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
< 2n−k.
Conversely, it is not obvious whether choosing the smallest possible values of s = k − j and
r = n−k independently for each inequality does imply the existence of the OTR-code. However,
we observed experimentally that this was a sufficient condition for all tested small parameters.
Usually an even better code can be found.
For moderate values of (j, q, f) OTR codes can be efficiently constructed using the following
algorithm: For r and s choose the smallest values according to Table 1 (or more conservatively
according to the Gilbert-Varshamov bound). Choose the parity check matrix of a [j + s+ r, j +
s, f + 1] code. Calculate the corresponding generator matrix. Transform the generator matrix
using elementary row operations to the canonical form by taking care that any q columns in
the parity check matrix are linearly independent. If this constraint cannot be met select another
parity check matrix and repeat the procedure. Increasing s or r will generally increase the number
of solutions. Two examples for OTR codes can be found in appendix D: OTR(7,4,1;2,2) and in
appendix E: OTR(16,11,6;3,3). It should be noted, that optimal solutions are usually obtained
for smaller values of r and s than indicated by Gilbert’s theorem. The OTR(16,11,6;3,3) code
is such an example.
6 Summary
We have considered the problem of privacy and integrity protection in cryptographic circuits in
a white-box scenario for a powerful, yet limited attacker. By introducing a coding theoretical
framework we have shown that constructing an optimal masking scheme (as a privacy protection
method) can be considered as the dual problem to finding an optimal error code (as an integrity
protection method). The new formulation unifies the known linear masking schemes and allows
us to find lower bounds for the number of masks needed to protect a circuit against qth order
probing attacks. In this attack scenario the information leakage of the OPS code based masking
schemes is smaller than that of Vernam’s OTP scheme. Finally, we considered combined probing
and forcing attacks and derived the structure of optimal linear tamper resistant codes (OTR),
which are eligible to preserve both, privacy and integrity, in qth order probing and fth order
forcing attacks. A procedure for the construction of OTR codes has been proposed.
It is immediate that all linear structures of a cryptographic algorithm can be efficiently
protected by OPS and OTR codes. Although the lower bounds given by the linear constructions
are still applicable for the nonlinear parts of an algorithm a linear coding scheme generally does
not propagate through a nonlinear operation. Tamper protection of nonlinear structures will, for
example, necessitate the application of extra masks and of nonlinear codes which are compatible
with the specific nonlinear operation. This is a target for future analysis.
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A Example for OPS(7,4;2) masking scheme
A number of s = 3 mask bits provides probing security PS(2) for data words of length k = 4.
The canonical probing matrix in the OPS(7,4;2) masking scheme is a [7, 4, 3] Hamming code.
P23,7 =
1 1 0 1 1 0 01 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1
 . (7)
In explicit terms, the corresponding generator matrix (2) induces the masking scheme
(x1, . . . , x4,m1,m2,m3) 7→ (x1+m1+m2, x2+m1+m3, x3+m2+m3, x4+m1+m2+m3,m1,m2,m3).
B Example for OPS(16,11;3) masking scheme
A number of s = 5 mask bits can provide probing security PS(3) for data words of length
k = 11. The canonical probing matrix in the OPS(16,11;3) masking scheme is a [16, 11, 4] Hsiao
code [10].
P35,16 =

1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
 . (8)
C Example for OPS(17,9;4) masking scheme
The [17, 9, 5] quadratic residue code, cf. [14], generates an OPS(17,9;4) masking scheme. Using
the generator polynomial x8+x5+x4+x3+1 the following canonical probing matrix is obtained.
P49,17 =

1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

. (9)
D Example for OTR(7,4,1;2,2) tamper resistant code
To achieve a forcing security of order 2, FRS(2), we start with the parity check matrix of a
[7, 4, 3] Hamming code. The distance of this code is dmin = 3 and the number of redundancy
bits is r = n− k = 3.
H =
1 1 0 1 1 0 01 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1
 . (10)
As given by Tab. 1 a number of s = 3 masks bits is required to achieve PS(2) for an OPS code
of length n = 7. Hence a maximum of j = k − s = 1 information bits can be protected. The
canonical generator matrix can be easily constructed by applying elementary row operations:
G =

1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
 . (11)
It is immediate that any two columns in the probing matrix (lower part of G) are linearly
independent. Hence this OTR code is PS(2).
E Example for OTR(16,11,6;3,3) tamper resistant code
In this nontrivial example we use a minimum weight Hsiao code (dmin = 4) of length n = 16
and dimension k = 11 as a starting point to achieve FRS(3),
H =

1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
 . (12)
From Tab. 1 we see that s = 5 masks are necessary to secure n = 16 bits against a probing
attack of order 3. Applying elementary row operations the generator matrix of an equivalent
PS(3)-secure code can be constructed:
G =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0

. (13)
This OTR code can secure j = k − s = 6 bits of information simultaneously against FRA(3)
and PA(3) attacks.
